October 17, 2024<\/p>\n
5 min read<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
Biden\u2019s Withdrawal Made Containing War in the Middle East Harder<\/p>\n
As tensions soar in the Middle East, the president\u2019s lame duck status hinders efforts to manage the escalation of risks in the region<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
By Andrew Payne<\/a><\/p>\n US President Joe Biden speaks about the situation in Israel as he holds an interagency briefing on the Hurricane Helene response and recovery efforts in the Roosevelt Room of the White House on October 1, 2024 in Washington, DC.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Saul Loeb\/AFP via Getty Images<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n Joe Biden has insisted that ending the war in Gaza and bringing peace and security to the Middle East remains a top priority during his final months in office. Yet even freed from the burden of campaigning following his July withdrawal from the race, the president has since proven unwilling, or unable, to control the risks of spiraling conflict in the region.<\/p>\n Instead, after Israel dramatically stepped up its military campaign<\/a> against Hezbollah in Lebanon, a wider war now appears likelier than at any point since the terrorist attacks<\/a> first committed by Hamas in 2023.<\/p>\n A look at history and political science suggests Biden\u2019s decision to abandon his bid for reelection, ironically, is a major cause of his ineffectiveness in defusing the conflict. Described<\/a> by some as the final act of public service in a storied political career, the president\u2019s withdrawal immediately weakened his ability to manage crises across the globe. This erosion of presidential authority at one of the most dangerous geopolitical moments in living memory is among the most serious and underappreciated consequences of his decision to step aside.<\/p>\n If you’re enjoying this article, consider supporting our award-winning journalism by subscribing<\/a>. By purchasing a subscription you are helping to ensure the future of impactful stories about the discoveries and ideas shaping our world today.<\/p>\n Biden is only the third president to abandon reelection since the end of the Second World War, with Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson his predecessors. Other \u201clame-duck\u201d presidents, at the end of their second terms, have had ambitious \u201cto-do\u201d lists in the realm of foreign policy. The absence of reelection pressures has led many outgoing incumbents to turn<\/a> to diplomacy, international agreements and the use of force to cement their legacy. The Middle East has frequently tempted those in the twilight of their terms to pursue an opportunity to earn laurels as a peacemaker<\/a>. In recent months, fading hopes<\/a> of brokering an Israel-Saudi normalization agreement appeared to sustain Biden\u2019s optimism about stabilizing the region.<\/p>\n These plays for posterity, however, usually fail. The idea that a president not facing reelection can act free of domestic political concerns misses the point: \u201cHe may be free,<\/a> but he is not taken seriously as he reaches the end of his second term,\u201d wrote William Quandt, a veteran of former president Jimmy Carter\u2019s Camp David Accords\u2014which led to a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Largely unable to make commitments that outlast their presidency, lame ducks simply lack credibility when cutting deals and issuing threats. Both allies and adversaries face incentives to consider what a future administration might do instead.<\/p>\n The failure of Biden\u2019s attempts to moderate the policies of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is therefore unsurprising. On the one hand, Kamala Harris remains committed to the current administration\u2019s position\u2014and has at times appeared<\/a> sharper in her criticism of Israel\u2019s military campaign. Former president Donald Trump, by contrast, called<\/a> on Biden to let Israel \u201cfinish the job\u201d in June and has since cast<\/a> himself as Israel\u2019s \u201cprotector<\/a>,\u201d lambasting<\/a> repeated calls by Harris for a ceasefire as an effort to \u201ctie Israel\u2019s hand behind its back.\u201d These positions reflect broader partisan dimensions of public views about the war, with 42 percent of Republicans favoring unconditional support for Israel compared with just 8 percent of Democrats, according to recent analysis<\/a> by the Institute for Global Affairs. And they leave Netanyahu in little doubt as to where his election outcome interests lie.<\/p>\n Of course, the leverage that Biden has been willing to wield over Netanyahu has always been limited. For example, the red line that Biden said he established over the planned assault on Rafah in May\u2014indicating the U.S. would not supply weapons for an offensive attack\u2014turned out<\/a> to be more of a pink smudge. Aside from a brief suspension<\/a> of some munitions, U.S. weapons have continued to flow to Israel uninterrupted. Earlier this year, meaningful pressure<\/a> had mounted on the administration to take a tougher stance. With pro-Palestinian protests sweeping<\/a> the nation and large numbers of young voters and Arab Americans casting \u201cuncommitted\u201d ballots in the Democratic primaries in February, it looked like Biden might have a significant \u201cGaza problem<\/a>\u201d come November.<\/p>\n Then came his withdrawal. Biden is still committed to ensuring a Democratic victory in November. But the Harris campaign\u2019s momentum has blunted the power of antiwar voices of the Democratic Party\u2019s left wing to force a shift in U.S. policy. Protests at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago were smaller<\/a> than expected. Polls remain<\/a> tight in Wisconsin and Michigan, but new paths to electoral victory have emerged<\/a> for Harris. The net effect is that the greater political threat to Democrats on the Middle East now comes from the right.<\/p>\n This likely explains why the administration\u2019s recent efforts to ratchet up<\/a> pressure on Netanyahu to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza were not intended<\/a> to be made public. When details leaked<\/a>, the timeline afforded to Israel to comply\u2014stretching beyond the U.S. election\u2014only underscored the weakness of the outgoing administration\u2019s position. Even if Biden imposed punitive measures, the possibility of a Trump victory in November\u2014in which case there is a strong likelihood Trump would then simply restore U.S. support\u2014would temper any Israeli desire to make lasting concessions to Biden.<\/p>\n As I have argued in a recent book<\/a>, there is plenty of precedent for the challenge Biden now faces. In 1952 Truman found it impossible to resolve a United Nations impasse regarding an armistice agreement that would end the war in Korea. Having ruled himself out of the presidential race in March, Truman had the political space to stick with a negotiating position on the status of prisoners of war that he understood to be deeply unpopular with voters. But he lacked the leverage to convince those on the other side of the negotiating table to fall in line. As allies and adversaries increasingly looked to other candidates for clues about the future of U.S. policy, negotiations languished, and troops remained engaged in what one historian called<\/a> \u201cbitter and costly fighting for several inconsequential hills.\u201d<\/p>\n Lyndon Johnson faced a similar challenge over Vietnam. In his withdrawal speech in March 1968, Johnson told<\/a> the public that without campaign pressures he could focus fully on the pursuit of peace. But in a series of taped telephone conversations, he recognized that his decision had seriously undermined his bargaining position. As Election Day approached, Johnson practically begged the remaining candidates to minimize their public statements on the war for fear that it would jeopardize his last-ditch efforts to reach an agreement with the North Vietnamese. \u201cIf they can hold out three more weeks and get a little better deal\u2014buy the horse a little cheaper from you than they can from me, they\u2019re going to wait,\u201d he said<\/a> in one call. Indeed, by the time Johnson left office, negotiators were still deadlocked over what shape the negotiating table should be. And without a peace agreement, 1968 turned out to be the bloodiest year<\/a> of the entire war.<\/p>\n Biden\u2019s chances of succeeding where his predecessors failed appear bleak. A Harris win in November would restore some credibility to the outgoing administration\u2019s diplomatic efforts. But as conflict spreads across the Middle East, it seems likely that the current president\u2019s hopes of securing peace on his watch were dashed the moment he drafted his letter indicating his withdrawal, and sent it out<\/a> to the world.<\/p>\n This is an opinion and analysis article, and the views expressed by the author or authors are not necessarily those of <\/i>Scientific American.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n![\"Close](\"https:\/\/static.scientificamerican.com\/dam\/m\/2eeb9e56e47d4f5b\/original\/president_biden_briefing_on_israel_and_hurricane_helene.jpg?w=600\")
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